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Delaying truth recovery for
missing personsn
IOSIF KOVRAS AND NEOPHYTOS LOIZIDES
School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University
Belfast, UK
ABSTRACT. The fate of missing persons is a central issue in postconﬂict societies
facing truth recovery and human rights dilemmas. Despite widespread public sym-
pathy towards relatives, societies emerging from conﬂict often defer the recovery of
missing for decades. More paradoxically, in post-1974 Cyprus, the ofﬁcial authorities
delayed unilateral exhumations of victims buried within cemeteries in their own
jurisdiction. Analysis of ofﬁcial post1974 discourses reveals a Greek-Cypriot consensus
to emphasise the issue as one of Turkish aggression, thus downplaying in-group
responsibilities and the legacy of intra-communal violence. We compare the experience
of Cyprus with other postconﬂict societies such as Spain, Northern Ireland, and
Mozambique and explore the linkages between institutions and beliefs about transi-
tional justice. We argue that elite consensus initiates and facilitates the transition to
democracy but often leads to the institutionalisation of groups opposing truth recovery
even for in-group members.
KEY WORDS: Cyprus; elite framing; missing persons; political learning; truth
recovery; spoilers
All the missing persons’ families have suffered regardless of their ethnic origins. They
might be Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Armenians, or they might be Israelis,
Palestinians, Argentineans, Vietnamese, or in Bosnia-Herzegovina they might be
Serbs, Bosnians or any other ethnic origin. All families had similar fate and suffering
dreams and nightmares. All these missing persons’ families are in a way related.1
In deeply divided societies, groups tend to mobilise widespread sympathy for
victims of conﬂict including those persons kidnapped or missing and their
families left behind without an answer to their fate. Recovery of missing
persons also ranks high on the international agenda as illustrated in the high-
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level meeting of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with the families of
Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean agents in the 1970s (Landler
and Fackler 2009). Likewise, the release of Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, held
hostage by Hamas has became a cause ce´le`bre in Israel prompting the
personal intervention of former US President Jimmy Carter (Derfner 2009).
In Northern Ireland the fate of several persons who ‘disappeared’ in the 1970s
– presumably through the clandestine activities of the IRA – remains a
pressing issue, prompting calls for truth recovery a decade after the signing of
the Good Friday Agreement (Hamber 1998: 78–9; McDonald 2007). From
the Middle East to the Balkans to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America,
civil society groups and international organisations call for a humanitarian
approach to the recovery of missing persons (Baraybar, Brasey and Zabel
2007; Cretoll and Rosa La 2006). The frecent remarkable mobilisation of
Spanish civil society to exhume the body of poet Federico Garcia Lorca as a
means of addressing the legacy of the Spanish civil war (Tremlett 2006)
reafﬁrms that a dead body is ‘the mark of a good political symbol: it has
legitimating effects not because everyone agrees on its meaning but because it
compels interest despite views of what it means’ (Verdery 1999: 31). Arguably,
among the strongest symbols to revitalise virulent Serbian nationalism in the
former Yugoslavia were the televised exhumations and reburials of World
War II victims of genocide in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Denich 1994:
382).
Looking at the case of Cyprus, we argue that missing persons carry huge
symbolic and emotional capital that can be easily manipulated, becoming
hegemonic and institutionalised, shifting public discourse away from legit-
imate, even commonsense approaches to truth recovery. Missing and kid-
napped persons, or more generally, unrecovered dead bodies, constitute
emotionally charged symbols in the aftermath of conﬂict. Their stories
frequently turn into instruments which bolster propaganda, demobilise agents
of conciliation, and mobilise extremist groups by reasserting ‘cultures of
victimhood’ (Bouris 2007; Brewer 2004; Kaufman 2001; Ross 2007).
The article is divided into two parts. The ﬁrst contains a brief introduction
to the problem of missing persons in Cyprus and the puzzle of why the two
communities have not addressed this problem, either together or unilaterally.
We compare the experience of Cyprus with other postconﬂict societies, and we
present a number of alternative explanations that are ultimately unconvin-
cing. In the second part, we propose an explanation for the considerable delay
in truth recovery and the resolution of the problem. After analysing interviews
with members of the designated parliamentary committee for missing persons,
as well as material from parliamentary debates, we argue that an early tacit
consensus was constructed surrounding the case of the missing persons which
identiﬁed Turkey as the sole responsible agent and downplaying the legacy of
intra-communal violence within the Greek-Cypriot community. This con-
sensus gradually became a ‘hegemonic’ founding tenet of the transition to
democracy and restricted both the prospect and the scope of truth recovery.
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The Cyprus puzzle
During two waves of violence2 – the inter-communal violence of 1963–7, and
the intra-communal violence accompanying the 1974 coup against the
legitimate government of Cyprus and the subsequent Turkish invasion –
approximately 2,000 persons went missing from both Greek-Cypriot and
Turkish-Cypriot communities (Sant Cassia 2006: 195).3 Despite the rigorous
involvement of the international factor – with the participation of the UN and
its establishment of a bicommunal Committee for the Missing Persons (CMP)
in 1981 – until lately, not a single grave was dug up because of the lack of
bicommunal trust and cooperation.4
Oddly, only a few months after the failed referenda for the reuniﬁcation of the
island (April 2004) and at a time when bicommunal trust had reached a nadir, a
bicommunal agreement was reached. This strengthened the role of the CMP and
rekindled the hope that some missing persons would be exhumed and buried
(Kovras 2008). In fact, the CMP has managed to exhume 466 individuals and
identify 110 (CMP 2008). At the same time, other recent developments reveal a
renewed interest in ‘unearthing’ the truth of the violent past within and across
communities. These include attempts to revise history textbooks on both sides of
the division (Papadakis 2008; Vural and O¨zuyanik 2008) and a growing grassroots
civil society with a pro-reconciliation proﬁle (Hadjipavlou 2006) which supports
the struggle of the relatives of the missing to trace their relatives and to recover
historical memory. An example is the recently established (2007) ‘Bi-Communal
Initiative of Relatives of Missing Persons, Victims of Massacre and War’, whose
agenda contradicts the ‘ofﬁcial narratives’ of the two communities.
The question that unavoidably emerges is why, despite massive popular
support for the resolution of this humanitarian issue, not to mention the long-
term involvement of the international community and the expressed political
will of political elites to resolve it, there was no coordinated action by the two
communities for more than three decades. Perhaps even more surprisingly,
there was valid information that Greek-Cypriot citizens of the Republic of
Cyprus – presumed missing – were actually buried in cemeteries within the
control of the internationally recognised state. Given the deadlock in
bicommunal negotiations, why did Greek-Cypriots not take the option of
unilateral exhumation?
Alternative explanations
A fairly obvious reason for the stagnant situation over recent decades was the
de facto partition of the island; this prohibited any investigation of missing
persons on the ‘other’ side of the divide while simultaneously preventing the
formation of bi-communal grassroots initiatives vociferously demanding the
truth. According to the politicians we interviewed, before the opening of the
checkpoints in 2003, it was absurd to talk about exhumations because of the
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(physical) obstacles caused by the division.5 Still, the ﬁrst exhumations took
place after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for a process of unilateral
exhumations within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus in late 1999
(Sant Cassia 2007). These revealed that several mass graves containing Greek-
Cypriots perceived to be missing were located within the Republic of Cyprus
(Paroutis 1999). Therefore, the argument that any development on the issue of
missing persons before 2003 was impossible is not convincing, precisely
because the fate of the ﬁrst identiﬁed missing persons was unravelled without
the cooperation of the ‘other’ side (Drousiotis 2000).
The ‘demonisation of the other’ is a common feature of postconﬂict settings
(Anastasiou 2008; Hadjipavlou 2007; Heraclides 2002). Hence, according to the
Greek-Cypriot narrative, another (popular) justiﬁcation for the delay is that the
missing persons problem was exclusively created by the Turkish invasion. Thus,
the single factor determining the resolution of this problem was Turkey – any
development was out of the control of the Republic of Cyprus. As a member of
the designated parliamentary committee on missing persons starkly put it, ‘Here
we have to deal with Turkey . . . [Y]ou cannot cooperate easily with the Turks’.6
Yet while Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side were responsible for the majority
of the Greek-Cypriot missing, a number of cases could have been resolved
internally, thus mitigating the pain of relatives.
Another popular explanation points to the inﬂuence of European institutions.
Recent developments regarding the identiﬁcation of the fate of missing persons
in Cyprus have been attributed to the decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) condemning Turkey for its non-cooperation.7 This
explanation is not entirely sufﬁcient, however, because other countries with
similar problems of missing persons had joined the EU or had been subject to
ECHR rulings decades earlier with minimal positive effects. Although Spain has
been inﬂuenced by European norms for decades, the issue of exhuming missing
persons from the civil war did not become a state priority even when consecutive
socialist governments came into power (1982–96) (Tremlett 2006). It was put
onto the national agenda only after a demand for truth recovery was clearly
framed and formulated by civil society groups. Interestingly, non-European
nations with similar memories of clandestine violence and missing persons, such
as Argentina, Guatemala, and Chile, have seen more successful mobilisations of
their societies towards ‘truth recovery’ (Kovras 2008; Rotberg and Thompson
2001). In Cyprus, European institutions might have had a facilitative effect,
primarily through ECHR decisions, but the effort to understand the puzzle of
the missing needs to focus on domestic factors, particularly the framing of
human rights issues to combat the ‘other’ side.
Linking frames and policy outcomes
Awell-entrenched elite consensus was constructed in the aftermath of the coup
d’e´tat and the Turkish invasion (1974) deﬁning the fundamental (political)
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tenets upon which the post1974 Republic of Cyprus is established. This
consensus – regarding what will be remembered and what will remain hidden
– was subsequently transformed into a hegemonic belief, dictating public
discourse and decreasing both the adaptability of the political leadership to
new conditions and the possibility of resolving the issue.8 This section
discusses the causal mechanisms that allowed the original elite consensus to
become hegemonic, effectively preventing truth recovery: elite framing of the
issue of the missing persons; the (negotiated) nature of the transition to
democracy; and the institutionalisation of ‘spoiler’ groups.
Framing processes account for the ways political elites disseminate ideas to
the public, particularly on emotionally charged issues such as missing persons
and more generally truth recovery. According to Ervin Goffman, frames
denote ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals to ‘locate, per-
ceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at
large (1974: 21). Put another way, to frame is to select aspects of a perceived
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as
to promote a particular problem deﬁnition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and treatment for the item described (Entman 1993: 52). Frames
deﬁne ‘reality’ because of their ability to emphasise certain aspects of an issue
while downgrading others (Benford 1997; Benford and Snow 2000; Brewer,
Graf and Willnat 2003). A central feature of the framing process is the degree
of instrumentalisation involved, particularly in appropriating, negotiating
and reaching a consensus on a shared meaning of a given situation (Loizides
2009).
The primary objective of a hegemonic belief is ‘the containment and
political neutralisation of latent tensions which, if unleashed, would threaten
the power of those whose interests the conceptions serve’ (Lustick 1993: 123).
The concept of hegemony, as expressed in the work of Antonio Gramsci,
indicates ‘active consent’ of dominated groups, founded on ‘ideas’, values,
and symbols, not on force (Bates 1975; Jessop 1982: 147; Martin 1998: 66).
Therefore, the success of hegemonic beliefs depends on successful framing.
Eventually, when a frame becomes hegemonic – as the case of missing persons
in Cyprus reafﬁrms – certain inconvenient questions are excluded from public
debate. According to Ian Lustick, hegemonic beliefs become so well en-
trenched in our daily life that they are perceived as ‘natural’ and, as such, not
subject to critical scrutiny (Lustick 1996).
Hegemonic frames and the house of representatives
The framing process has two essential analytical components. The ﬁrst,
‘diagnostic framing’, refers to the need to identify the source(s) of the
problematic situation and attribute blame (Benford and Snow 2000). The
concept is founded on the presumption that the present situation is unjust,
and grievances are largely due to the action of another agent (Gamson 1992;
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Kaufman 2008; Klandermans 1997). The second component, ‘prognostic
framing,’ is the articulation of a projected answer to a given problem, along
with a strategy to implement this plan (Benford and Snow 2000).
It is important to note that in the Greek-Cypriot community the founda-
tions of the hegemonic framing on the issue of missing persons were laid
immediately after the Turkish invasion when a common diagnosis of the
problem was widely endorsed by the political parties in Parliament.9 More
precisely, in the House of Representatives, Turkey is held causally and
morally responsible not merely for the creation of the problem, but for other
‘traumas’ such as the occupation of thirty-seven per cent of the island which
forced approximately 211,000 persons to become refugees, and the creation of
the problem of ‘enclaved’ persons.
Since 1974, twelve resolutions on the issue of missing persons have been
issued by the House of Representatives, all identifying Turkey as the primary
responsible actor and all of them adopted unanimously.10 Every member of
the designated parliamentary committee for missing persons that we inter-
viewed identiﬁed the Turkish invasion (1974) as the starting point of the
problem and Turkey as the sole morally responsible agent. This reading recurs
in every reference to the problem of missing persons – irrespective of the
ideological inclination of the speaker – in the speeches of the members of
parliament. Moreover, in the preelection political programmes of the candi-
dates for the Presidency over the last three decades, the issue of missing
persons has always been grouped with the other problems triggered by the
Turkish invasion and issues more generally related to the ‘Cyprus Problem’,
namely, demanding justice from Turkey.11
The ﬁrst and perhaps most signiﬁcant illustration of this reading of the
problem emerged in the debates of the political leaders during the ﬁrst
anniversary of the coup, in 1975. During this session, all party leaders endorsed
a perspective which tacitly linked the problem of missing persons to the side-
effects of the Turkish invasion, such as refugees and the occupation of the
island.12 Twenty years after the Turkish invasion (1994), the reading remains
unaltered, as illustrated in the following Parliamentary announcement:
The House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus, with the completion of the
grievous anniversary of 20 years after the Turkish invasion and the creation of the
tragic problem of the Missing, heavily condemns the continuous intransigent stance of
the Turkish side.13
Debates about intra-group conﬂict are absent from the diagnostic framing. In
fact, the Turkish invasion was preceded by internal violence within the Greek-
Cypriot community between supporters of President Makarios who followed
a ‘pro-independence policy’, and supporters of ‘union with Greece’ (enosis).
This period of intense intra-ethnic conﬂict led to a short-term coup by the
supporters of a pro-enosis policy – sponsored by the Greek junta – on 15 July
1974, sending President Makarios into exile and leading to atrocities and
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assassinations against his supporters including members of the communist
party (AKEL 1975).14
The tacit consensus to avoid debates related to intra-communal violence is
illustrated by the deﬁnition of missing persons in laws passed by Parliament
over the past three decades: ‘the Greek-Cypriot who is still missing since 20
July 1974, due to the Turkish invasion . . . and the state has no positive
information that s/he died’.15 Several interesting aspects of diagnostic framing
are present in this deﬁnition. First, there is no provision for the Turkish-
Cypriot citizens of the Republic of Cyprus still missing from 1963 or for the
missing Greek-Cypriots of the same period. Second, the Greek-Cypriots who
died during the intra-communal violence (15–20 July 1974) but whose remains
were not found are excluded. As a result, the diagnostic framing concerning
the problem of the missing persons overlaps with the Greek-Cypriot ‘ofﬁcial
narrative’ on the Cyprus issue, beginning only after the Turkish invasion of 20
July 1974. Moreover, although there was an effort to de-link the issue of
missing persons from the Cyprus problem – at least verbally – every speech of
the members of the parliament, irrespective of their ideological inclination, on
the Turkish invasion was followed almost spontaneously by a reference to the
missing persons.16
It should be mentioned that there was a degree of variation concerning this
discourse among political parties. More speciﬁcally, those political parties
with historical afﬁliations to President Makarios (DIKO, EDEK and the
Leftist AKEL) have apportioned blame to ‘extremist individuals’ in the anti-
Makarios camp for atrocities committed against the Turkish-Cypriots. How-
ever, no party has blamed state-controlled institutions such as the police for
complicity.17 ‘Forgetting’ particular aspects of the Cyprus problem along with
the responsibilities of the institutions of the Republic related to the human
rights abuses of Turkish-Cypriots became part of the tacit pact which facili-
tated the transition to democracy and the ‘reestablishment’ of the Republic of
Cyprus.
Cyprus is not the only case of ‘negotiated’ transition established on
oblivion. Mozambique presents an equally interesting case of a ‘silenced’
transition. The independence of the country from Portugal in 1975 was
followed by a bloody civil war which lasted until 1992. The consolidation of
democracy was achieved with the tacit consensus between the former parties
in conﬂict (FRELIMO-RENAMO) to forget their violent past (Graybill 2004;
Igreja 2008). In a similar vein, the transition to democracy in Spain was
founded on the ‘pact of oblivion’, or the widespread political consensus to
‘forget’ the violent legacy of the civil war and the dictatorship (Encarnacio´n
2008). Even when the Spanish Communist Party was legalised and the
Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) held power for fourteen consecutive years
(1982–96) the two parties deliberately ‘silenced’ the demand of a ‘handful of
relatives of the victims’ to exhume the civil war desaparecidos because that
might have derailed the path towards democratic consolidation (Tremlett
2006). Similarly, in Northern Ireland, the case of ‘the disappeared’ – the nine
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persons alleged to be ‘spies of the British’ who were killed by the IRA but
whose remains have not been found – reasserts that comprehensive truth
recovery is unwelcome because it sheds light on the ‘notorious’ aspects of
previously admired groups and delegitimises the predominant discourse.
Any reference either to the Turkish or the Greek-Cypriots who went missing
before the Turkish invasion would have seriously delegitimised the predomi-
nant discourse; it would have opened a Pandora’s box, letting out all sorts of
inconvenient questions (Kovras 2008: 377). For example, was the Agreement of
London-Zurich an end in itself or a means to a higher end (enosis)? Were the
Greek-Cypriot victims of EOKA – predominantly leftist – conspirators, and if
not, should their memory be acknowledged? To what extent were institutions of
the Republic responsible for Turkish-Cypriots who went missing in the 1960s?
Were the coupists traitors, outdated ideologues, or simply unlucky conscripts
serving their military service at the wrong time? Was the Turkish invasion
partly justiﬁed by the preceding inter- and intra-communal ﬁghting?
The issue that naturally follows the attribution of blame is the development
of a strategy to alter the problematic situation (prognostic framing). A
widespread elite consensus in the post1974 – Greek-dominated – Republic
of Cyprus on the causes of the invasion facilitated a process of political
learning and paved the way for a stable transition to democracy. Three
fundamental strategies addressed the causes of the problem: (a) emphasising
national unity and reconciliation, as expressed through the strengthening of
the institutions of the Republic to avoid the divisive experiences of the past
and promote re-uniﬁcation; (b) accentuating the culture of victimhood as
expressed in the traumatic side-effects of the Turkish invasion (missing
persons, refugees, casualties, those still in enclaves, etc.) as the foundation
of this new ‘invented unity’; and ﬁnally, (c) lobbying international forums to
condemn Turkey and force it to adopt a more accommodative stance.
The ﬁrst seems to have been determined by the ﬁrst anniversary of the
coup. Although not directly referring to the missing, debates among party
leaders during that session are revealing. The starkest image is provided by
Glafkos Clerides (DISY), later President of the Republic, who underlined the
‘dangers’ lurking from the ‘partisanship’ objectives in the common struggle
for the ‘survival’ of the Republic.18
Likewise, an emphasis on the need to overcome past divisions and
construct a uniﬁed block within the Greek-Cypriot community to protect
the Republic of Cyprus and promote re-uniﬁcation is shared by the leaders of
all political parties.19 Several resolutions adopted by Parliament reveal that a
common ground for consensus was the feeling of victimhood triggered by the
‘unjustiﬁed’ Turkish aggression. This was symbolised in the problems of
missing persons, the occupation of part of the island, the refugees, and the
enclaved.20 The parliamentary committee tackling issues related to the
problem of missing persons is called the Committee on Refugees-Enclaved-
Missing-Adversely Affected Persons, thereby noting an emphasis on con-
structing a (coherent) narrative to link all aspects/symbols of victimisation. In
r The authors 2009. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2009
8 Neophytos Loizides and Iosif Kovras
any national narrative, the credibility of the proffered frame is based on the
claim’s consistency, and there is an effort to establish a symbolic continuity.
According to this reading, all refugees, missing, enclaved, and casualties of
the invasion became victims of the (unjustiﬁed) Turkish aggression, and it was
a national duty to redress their suffering. According to the prevalent view of
members of parliament, ‘the society should become the head of the family for
those families without a guardian’.21 The framing of the missing persons as
the symbol of the unjustiﬁed suffering of the Greek-Cypriot people and the
‘natural’ duty of the society to compensate these victims gradually became a
hegemonic truth/reality which was difﬁcult to challenge. The most signiﬁcant
symbol of this culture of victimhood became the number 1,619, denoting the
number of (Greek-Cypriot) missing persons. Framing of the issue was closely
linked to this number, and although the number was inaccurate, it became
difﬁcult to re-adjust it to reﬂect the real number of missing persons. Strikingly,
over the period 1981–99, although the names on the list of missing persons
were sometimes different, the overall number/symbol remained intact, 1,619
(Sant Cassia 2007: 51).
In the early 1990s during discussions for the establishment of the Uni-
versity of Cyprus, there was consensus that the relatives of the victim groups
should enter university without exams. A member of the parliament dared to
challenge this hegemonic frame by saying, ‘My brother was killed during the
ﬁrst day of the invasion, but I can see no reason why his children should enter
the university if they do not qualify in the exams’.22 The reply from the rest
was ﬁerce, insisting that the ‘university cannot be founded without incorpor-
ating the Cypriot realities’.23 The fact that missing persons became an integral
element of this ‘Cypriot reality’ shows that framing assumed a hegemonic
position.
It is important to highlight that this framing was remarkably stable and
widely endorsed by the vast majority of the political elites. According to the
literature on framing, the criterion for successful framing is the ‘credibility of
the proffered frame’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 620) which is based on: (a)
‘frame consistency’, that is the correspondence between frames, beliefs, and
actions; (b) ‘empirical credibility’, denoting the correspondence between the
frames offered and the realities of social life (Kaufman 2008); and (c) the
reliability of the frame-maker (Benford and Snow 2000: 620). We could add a
fourth factor – the degree to which the ‘framing process’ revolves around
securing a ‘value’ that is highly cherished by the given society (Snow et al.
1986: 469).
The framing of the issue of missing persons by the political elites in Cyprus
satisﬁes all of these requirements. First, the ‘credibility’ of the frame-maker is
important given that in Cyprus the level of trust in governmental institutions
is remarkably high (CIVICUS 2005: 97; Mavratsas 2003), making any
challenge to the discourse offered by the state very unlikely. Furthermore,
there was a remarkable consistency in the framing – persisting even today –
which was coupled with abundant empirical evidence that Turkey was solely
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responsible for the humanitarian disaster, ranging from the national narrative
of the past to a series of decisions taken by ECHR condemning Turkey as the
principal perpetrator. Indeed, even when it was revealed that several missing
persons were buried in the areas controlled by the Republic, thus signiﬁcantly
challenging the core assumption of the diagnostic framing, the framing was so
well entrenched that neither the political leadership nor civil society dared
question it.
Eventually, there was no ‘counter-framing’, that is an effort to ‘rebut,
undermine, or neutralise a person’s or group’s myths, versions of reality, or
interpretive framework’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 626). Any potential source
of counter-framing was prevented by the particular ‘texture’ of the nationalist
discourse that characterised both Cypriot communities, founded on ‘ethnic
autism’ and self-censorship (Papadakis 2006). More precisely, one factor that
deﬁnitely strengthened the appeal of this speciﬁc elite framing in the Greek-
Cypriot community was the Turkish-Cypriot ofﬁcial position that the
majority of the Greek-Cypriot missing persons were killed by other Greek-
Cypriots during the coup. Any Greek-Cypriot referring to the possibility that
some may have been killed during the coup was subject to the accusation of
providing support for ‘Turkish propaganda’.
Although there was no coherent counter-framing, it should be underlined
that there were at least three major challenges to the proffered frame, namely
the case of the wives of missing persons who – in a highly symbolic act –
started digging up graves in the Greek-Cypriot cemetery where the ﬁrst
exhumations of Greek-Cypriot missing persons later took place, therefore
overtly defying the ofﬁcial policy; the establishment of the ‘Bi-Communal
Initiative of Relatives of Missing Persons, Victims of Massacre and War’,
emphasising the sharing of their painful experiences and contravening the
ofﬁcial discourse; and more importantly the investigative groundbreaking
journalism of Andreas Paraschos and Sevgu¨l Uludag˘. Despite the importance
of these initiatives, in reality the ‘diagnostic and prognostic’ framing remained
almost intact.
Counter-framing constitutes a key in identifying alternative approaches to
truth recovery. In Northern Ireland, e.g., a counter-frame on the missing
originated from pro-reconciliation religious actors across the community
divide who framed the issue in non-partisan and non-political terms, empha-
sising primarily human suffering and the common religious obligation to offer
victims a proper burial (McDonald 2007). In Spain, too, the seeds of counter-
framing were planted during the debate over the extradition of the dictator of
Chile Pinochet to Spain (1999), a catalyst for breaking the domestic ‘silence’
over the repressive legacy of Franco in general and the civil war in particular.
At this historical juncture, the main grassroots organisation demanding
acknowledgment for the victims of the Spanish civil war, the ‘Association
for the Recovery of the Historical Memory’, was formed. In Cyprus, such
counter-frames were missing from public debate. As an interviewee revealed
to us, even when the government decided to change its approach on the issue
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of missing persons by putting forward unilateral exhumations in the Repub-
lic’s zone (Sant Cassia 2007: 195), the framing was so well established that
they decided to ‘leak’ the information about the ‘missing being buried in the
republic’ to journalists, because there was no alternative path of promoting a
policy that contravened these long-standing framings.
These reactions demonstrate an inherent paradox in the framing process.
On the one hand, the objective of any nascent frame is to become hegemonic
and to be widely accepted as the sole universal truth. On the other hand, by
the time a frame becomes hegemonic and institutionalised, the context of the
problem may have changed so radically that the frame, originally constructed
to promote certain interests and policies, now obstructs, contradicts, and
entraps the promotion of these same interests. Or to put it another way, elite
consensus narrows the options of policy-makers, preventing adaptation to
new conditions even when elites realise the need for a policy shift (Loizides
2009).
The ‘frozen democracy’ debate
In Cyprus the ‘political learning’ from the traumatic experiences of intra-
communal violence and the subsequent Turkish invasion (1974) to a large
extent explain the (negotiated) nature of the transition to democracy in the
post1974 Greek-Cypriot community. Following the ‘logic of consequences’
(Snyder and Vinjamury 2004), President Makarios extended an olive branch
to his opponents, and the transition to normalcy was achieved through the
unstated consensus of major political elites not to engage in trials against the
coupists with the partial exception of Nicos Sampson the leader of the coup
(Papadakis 1993). The motives behind Makarios’ decision to follow this
policy of pardon remain two of the central issues of contention in the
literature on that period, the two most prevalent explanations either focus
on the power of the coupists even after the restoration of the Republic, or on
the calculated political decision to apportion all blame to Turkey which acted
as a unifying force for the Greek-Cypriot community. Both explanations,
though, seem to strengthen the argument on political learning of the main
political actors.
Some degree of political learning among the political elites seems to have
been at play in facilitating this process. For Bermeo, ‘a critical mass of
learners’ subscribed to the new ‘reading’ of the past in order to adopt a more
consensual strategy and tactics which subsequently became the basis of the
elite pact and facilitated the consolidation of democracy (1992: 275). This
happened in Cyprus in the aftermath of the invasion. For instance, just a year
after the coup and the invasion, the leader of AKEL, Ezekias Papaioannou,
said: ‘It is obligatory not only to condemn (the coup) but most importantly to
draw useful conclusions for our future actions’; adding that ‘on this anniver-
sary of the fascist, criminal coup we have the obligation to the memory of all
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those – known and unknown – heroes of the Cyprus freedom to strengthen
patriotic unity’ (emphasis added).24 In the same vein, the former leader of
EDEK, Vassos Lyssarides, stated that ‘the tragic lesson of the criminal and
treacherous coup should be analysed and utilised . . . for the struggle of our
people for national salvation and national survival’.25
Although the literature emphasises the ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ aspects of
learning, the negotiated transition in Cyprus indicates that by drawing
incorrect or even ‘false analogies’, learning can also be ‘partial’. The traumatic
experience of the Turkish invasion acted as a ‘painful lesson’ for the groups
previously in conﬂict. That lesson had a positive impact on the reassessment
of their objectives and priorities, and strengthened the legitimacy of the
Republic of Cyprus (Mavratsas 1999: 98).26 However, because learning has to
be directed towards a wide audience, its meaning should be simple and ‘frame’
the experience in Manichean terms (good vs. bad; perpetrators vs. victims),
thus inhibiting introspection. In the case of Cyprus, the ‘lesson’ became
particularly popular because it was founded on the unifying premise that
Turkey was causally and morally responsible for the creation of this
humanitarian problem. Turkey was demonised and became the source of
every misdeed on the island. The lesson was only a partial one, however,
because it abstained from debating the moral, historical, and political
responsibilities of the Greek-Cypriot community.
Nevertheless, although forgetting was the norm, political parties in Cyprus
frequently recruited certain (symbolic) aspects of the past to polarise political
debate and gain political power. Something similar has happened in Mozam-
bique and Spain, particularly during elections. This was particularly the case
in the former, although the transition to democracy was achieved on the
agreement of the two conﬂicting parties to ‘forget’ the violent past and the
civil war, both parties frequently use ‘memory as a weapon’ to demarcate the
political ﬁeld (Igreja 2008).
The democratisation literature has noted the shortcomings of pacted
transitions. According to the ‘frozen democracies’ argument, although
‘negotiated transitions’ minimise the conﬂicts among politicians in a post-
conﬂict period and enable them to focus on other urgent problems (economy,
development, etc.), this is achieved at the expense of the quality of the
emerging democracy because (a) the power is concentrated at the hands of a
few political elites; (b) they impede the development of civil and political
rights; and (c) they prohibit the development of civil society (Diamond 1999;
Encarnacio´n 2003; Karl 1987; Licklider 1995: 685; Linz and Stepan 1996: 56).
In other words, ‘pacts make democracies more durable, but also make the
deepening of democracy more difﬁcult’ (Bermeo 2003: 166). In Cyprus, there
seems to be a causal thread linking the framing of the issue of missing persons
and the (pacted) nature of the transition. This negotiated transition facilitated
the establishment of a stable frame by the political elites, but eliminated any
potential sources of truth-seeking, predominantly the civil society. Undoubt-
edly, there are also other reasons that explain the deﬁciency of the civil society
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in the Greek-Cypriot community (Mavratsas 2003). What is interesting,
though, is that contrary to the example of other countries with missing
persons, predominantly in Latin America, where the relatives of the missing
were vocal in demanding the truth, in Cyprus the ofﬁcial organisation of the
relatives of the missing not only never challenged the ofﬁcial discourse, in
certain instances it blocked the recovery of truth.
Institutionalised ‘spoilers’
The argument will be put forward, therefore, that the civil society group
dedicated to the recovery of truth and the fate of missing persons in Cyprus
assumed the role of an institutional spoiler.27 Migdal’s ‘state-in-society’
approach contains several useful analytical insights in explaining the stance
of the organisation of relatives at certain historical junctures. As Migdal
argues, ‘it is not simply poorly designed policies or incompetent ofﬁcials or
insufﬁcient resources that explain the failures or mixed results of state policies.
States must contend with opposing groupings, some of which are quietly and
indirectly subversive’ (Migdal 2001: 12). At certain critical junctures the
leadership of the ‘Pankyprian Organisation of Parents and Relatives of
Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons’ acted as an institutionalised
‘spoiler’ preventing unilateral exhumations. The relatives of the missing
persons in the Greek-Cypriot community constitute a highly regarded group
because they symbolise the ongoing victimisation and suffering of the Greek-
Cypriot people. Its leaders soon realised their symbolic capital and decided to
play politics in the direction of the interests of the relatives (Drousiotis 2000).
As a result of their efforts, the relatives of missing persons gained considerable
material compensation from the government. One ﬁnds roads, parks, squares,
even a museum dedicated to the missing persons (Sant Cassia 2007: 157).
More importantly state support included positive discrimination in employ-
ment, ﬁnancial support for housing, no property taxation, and a pension for
relatives.28 Since the missing were deﬁned as victims of the Turkish invasion,
those challenging the ofﬁcial discourse by arguing that their own relatives
were killed during the coup may not have been able to claim all beneﬁts.
On the issue of pressure groups, Haklai identiﬁes two modes of state
penetration: ﬁrst, ‘having members of the group appointed to various
positions of decision-making’ and second, ‘having ofﬁcials whose loyalty to
the laws of the state is matched or surpassed by sympathy to the social
movement’s objective’ (Haklai 2007: 718). Both are present in the case of the
missing in Cyprus, since the organisation has always been closely linked to the
state (Drousiotis 2000). Moreover, in 2005 a legal provision indicated that the
designated ministry for resolving the practical and material problems relevant
to the relatives of the missing had to employ one member from the rganisation
to jointly make decisions that touched on the rights of the relatives of the
missing. Finally, the designated parliamentary committee on missing persons
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has always been supportive of the organisation’s cause. According to the
president of this committee: ‘The role of the Parliament, regarding our front
[the missing] is to help retain the unity . . . whenever you need it, the
Parliament along with the Organisation . . . can become a powerful pressure
group’ (Pan-Cyprian Organisation of Relatives of Missing Persons 2000: 25).
It is worth noting that all members of the designated parliamentary committee
whom we interviewed reiterated this sympathetic and preferential treatment of
the demands of the organisation.
Thus to avoid competition with civil society groups, states might often avoid
politicising the issue of their own missing. South Korean governments, for
example, have not politicised the issue of their citizens kidnapped by North
Korea in contrast to Japan who insisted on receiving ofﬁcial acknowledgement
on the same issue (French 2002). Likewise in Spain the case of the ‘desapar-
ecidos’ until very recently was deliberately not politicised because of the fear of
unveiling any aspect of the past related to memories of the civil war.
Conclusion
As this article argues, negotiated transitions to democracy in societies
emerging from conﬂict constitute exemplary cases of widespread (elite)
consensus. Because the foundations of the hegemonic discourse which
determine what will be ofﬁcially remembered and what will remain in oblivion
are set during the pact-making stage of a transition, the struggle to understand
transitional processes is pivotal. The founding tenets of elite consensus
become institutionalised and are diffused in society as ‘hegemonic versions’
of the past. Thus, the demand for truth about the past remains minimal. As
Marie Smyth observes: ‘Truth-tellers . . . are a threat to politicians, because
they have the power to disrupt hegemonic versions of truth, which are often
implicated in the ‘war by other means’. Arguably, truth telling can perform an
important function in unsettling the bifurcated but ﬁxed versions of truth
associated with polarization and disidentiﬁcation’ (2007: 175).
The experience of truth recovery in Cyprus yields insight into the struggle
of other postconﬂict societies to come to terms with their past. Post-Franco
Spain constitutes a celebrated example of a pacted transition, one which
substantiates the contention of this article that an early elite consensus
prevents truth recovery and adaptability to new conditions. Following the
death of Franco (1975), Spanish political elites achieved a remarkably stable
transition to democracy, founded on the widespread consensus to avoid any
reference to the violent past – speciﬁcally, the civil war and the Francoist
repression – depicted in the pacto del olvido29 (Encarnacio´n 2008). Because of
this well-entrenched consensus among the political elites, it became very
difﬁcult for any government over the last 30 years to ‘come to terms’ with the
legacy of the civil war (ibid.). Only in 2007, after several years of mobilisation
of the civil society, was this ‘culture of forgetting’ challenged, and a demand
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for truth was put on the political agenda (Kovras 2008).30 A similar consensus
was shaped among key political actors in Northern Ireland. Following the
Good Friday Agreement (1998), the issue of truth recovery was perceived as
risky and remained in the drawer (Smyth 2007).
Because negotiated transitions are particularly fragile, the main concern of
the parties committed to an agreement is to avoid taking any measure
that might polarise the political atmosphere; they do not want to provoke the
intransigent actors who act outside law and who might attempt to
derail the peace process (Smyth 2007). Truth recovery is an issue that might
provoke hardliners. On the one hand, in the short term, a strong consensus
might be a sine qua non precondition for stable transition; on the other
hand, in the long term, a political culture founded on ‘silencing’ challenging
voices might be disastrous. As the case of Tito’s Yugoslavia reveals, the
long period of ‘forceful forgetting’ of World War II crimes facilitated
the emergence of previously dormant and revisionist nationalisms in the 1990s
(Denich 1994). Hence, contrary to certain ‘deontological calls’ in the literature
for transitional justice for truth recovery, the experience of several societies with
‘missing persons’ reveals that pragmatic and symbolic considerations as well as
the type transition are always central in the resolution/non-resolution of the
problem of missing persons and truth recovery in general.
Therefore, the theoretically interesting conclusion deriving from the study
of truth recovery in Cyprus is that although elite pacts may ‘impose’ a ﬁxed
version of the past, a negotiated transition seems to gestate the (institutional)
preconditions for a future truth recovery. More precisely, elite pacts in
transitional settings indicate that a critical mass of elites have ‘learned the
lessons’ of the past, leading to a re-evaluation of societal objectives and a
consensus to resolve the very speciﬁc and urgent problems experienced by
postconﬂict societies – such as the restoration of the rule of law, economic
recovery, strengthening civil society, accessing international fora, and
strengthening democratic institutions, to name but a few. Because these
objectives are set consensually, they are usually met in an efﬁcient manner,
as is revealed in the cases of Cyprus and Spain.
Hence, in the long term the basic tools/preconditions for challenging this
‘reality’ are in the hands of the ‘truth-seekers’, such as a vibrant civil society,
democratic institutions, and civil liberties. Do ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ lead to
democratic consolidation, prosperity and ‘catharsis’? Or is it the reverse? Are
certain minimum levels of democratic consolidation and certain democratic
institutions necessary to challenge established beliefs? Admittedly our cases
could be read either way depending on the reader’s normative proclivities. We
do not advocate a particular type of transition; however, the case of Cyprus
demonstrates that truth recovery was delayed even when windows of
opportunity were present. The article points to the signiﬁcance of hegemonic
framing, partial political learning, and institutionalised constraints in evalu-
ating delay in truth recovery and, eventually, assessing their broader impact in
the study of democratic transitions.
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Notes
1 Kutlay Erk, Turkish-Cypriot politician and son of a missing person whose remains were
found in 2008. CYBC 15 December 2008.
2 Following its independence from the British Empire in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus
experienced a spiral of inter-ethnic violence between the two most signiﬁcant ethnic groups on
the island – that is the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities – leading to the
permanent division of the island since 1974. During the 1963–7 period of turbulence, the vast
majority of the Turkish-Cypriots were forced to abandon their houses and settle in enclaves
controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. Since then, and especially after the Turkish invasion
(1974), the Republic of Cyprus remains under the control of the Greek-Cypriot community and it
constitutes the only internationally recognised authority on the island. In 1983 the authorities of
the Turkish-Cypriot community declared the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC), which the international community does not recognise, with the exception of
Turkey.
3 According to the ﬁles submitted for consideration to the CMP by the two communities, the
precise number of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot missing persons is 1,493 and 502,
respectively.
4 The only exception is the exhumation of an American citizen in 1998, ‘missing’ since 1974.
5 In April 2003 Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denkta’ decided to open the checkpoints that had
divided the island for more than thirty years.
6 Anonymous interview, Nicosia, 16 July 2008.
7 Varnavas a.o.v. Turkey and the Fourth Inter-State Application of the Republic of Cyprus
against the Republic of Turkey, followed by consecutive resolutions of the Council of Europe’s
Committee of Ministers put signiﬁcant legal and political pressure on Turkey.
8 Ian Lustick draws on Gramsci’s ‘overall intention to elucidate the impact on political
outcomes associated with the transformation of particular beliefs into uncontested, and virtually
uncontestable, ‘commonsense’ apprehensions’ (Lustick 1993: 54).
9 During the ﬁrst bi-communal hostilities in 1963–4, the Turkish-Cypriot members of the
House of Representatives withdrew and since then this body has been dominated by the Greek-
Cypriot community.
10 Indicatively we can mention: N.37/1975; N.46/1978; N.58/1980; N.75/1982; N.113/1992.
11 Indicative examples are the preelectoral programmes of Spyros Kyprianou (1983); Georgios
Vasiliou (1988); Glafkos Clerides (1993, 2002); Tassos Papadopoulos (2003); Demetris Christoﬁas
(2008).
12 Parliamentary debates, Cyprus House of Representatives, 15 July 1975, pp. 576–91.
13 Parliamentary Debates, Cyprus House of representatives, 15 July 1994, p. 2554.
14 The roots of this fratricidal violence were set during the anti-colonial struggle (1955–9) carried
out by EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), when several sympathisers with the
leftist party (AKEL) were assassinated by EOKA ﬁghters (Crawshaw 1978; Papadakis 1998: 151).
It is estimated that approximately 200 Greek-Cypriots were stigmatised as ‘traitors’ and were
subsequently killed by EOKA ﬁghters (Drousiotis 2002: 219).
15 Cyprus, House of Representatives Laws: N. 77/1979; N.34/80; N. 53(I)/92. It was only in that
the deﬁnition of the missing slightly changed to encompass ‘any citizen of the Republic’. House of
Representatives, Law N.178(I)/2003.
16 See Parliamentary Debates, Cyprus House of Representatives, ‘
, 1974’, 15 July 1975, pp. 576–91; ‘
’, 28 January 1982, pp. 1147–208; ‘
’, 6 March 1992, pp. 1889–95.
17 For a rare admission of this complicity related to the case of Kutlay Erk’s father see, CYBC 15
December 2008. In fact, the moral and legal responsibility of the police is always a contentious
topic in postconﬂict settings. Acknowledging the tacit collusion of the police forces and loyalist
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paramilitaries during ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland was one of the most debated issues in the
peace process (McGarry and O’Leary 2009).
18 Parliamentary Debates, Cyprus House of Representatives, 15 July 1975, p. 577.
19 Parliamentary Debates, Cyprus House of Representatives, 15 July 1975, pp. 576–91.
20 Cyprus House of Representatives Resolutions N.37/1975; N.46/1978.
21 Parliamentary Debates, Cyprus House of Representatives, 6 March 1992, p. 1893.
22 Parliamentary Debates, Cyprus House of Representatives, 16 July 1992, p. 3607.
23 Parliamentary Debates, Cyprus House of Representatives, 16 July 1992, p. 3607.
24 Parliamentary Debates, Cyprus House of Representatives, 15 July 1975, pp. 579, 581.
25 Parliamentary Debates, Cyprus House of Representatives, 15 July 1975, p. 586.
26 Post-World War II Germany offers a similar example of ‘political learning’, since the
disastrous experience of World War I facilitated democratic consolidation by prioritising the
establishment of democratic institutions which subsequently strengthened the legitimacy of the
new regime (Sa’adah 2006).
27 Although we use the term ‘spoiler groups’, we should also acknowledge that the term ‘spoiler’
constitutes a ‘normatively negatively charged’ label which does not take into account the
legitimacy, the emotions and the suffering of certain groups in post-conﬂict societies – such as
the relatives of victims.
28 Cyprus House of Representatives Laws N.53(I)/1992; N.34/1980; N.24(I)/1998; N178(I).
29 ‘Pact of oblivion’.
30 In 2007, the Socialist government passed the ‘Law on Historical Memory’ which to a
signiﬁcant extent satisﬁes the demand for truth (Crawford 2007).
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